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Simon Joyce has written a welcome article that seeks to address why Britain’s strike record is at a historically low level.1 Simon’s argument 
is that the “confidence theory” of strike action, associated with the 
International Socialist tradition, is insufficient to explain contemporary 
labour quiescence. Simon does not dismiss the importance of worker 
confidence as a condition for robust strike activity, but suggests that the 
Socialist Workers Party has been over-optimistic in expecting confidence 
to rise during the long period of declining strike activity.2 Simon offers 
an explanation that places emphasis on the constraining power of the 
institutions within which trade unions operate. In particular, unions at 
workplace level have become increasingly restricted in their ability to take 
“lawful” strike action since the 1980s. As a result, Simon argues, legislative 
constraint has had a debilitating effect on shop stewards’ autonomy: “By the 
early 1990s the strike weapon had effectively been taken out of the hands 
of shop stewards.” Furthermore, “the fact that the strike weapon has been 
taken out of the hands of shop stewards means it will be very difficult for 
increasing anger and/or confidence to be translated into rising strike levels”.3
1: Joyce, 2015.
2: We should note that this decline is not confined to the UK, but is apparent across most 
Western European states—see Godard, 2011.
3: Joyce, 2015, pp120; 141.
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In presenting his case Simon has produced a sophisticated analysis, 
which delves into the mediatory processes such as structural changes in the 
economy, the suffocating role of the union bureaucracies, and key defeats 
for the unions that may explain a fall in strikes in the 1980s. Somewhat 
coyly, Simon has steered clear of presenting his case in terms of the 
“balance of class forces” or of the overall state of workers’ political and 
class consciousness, preferring to conduct an “analysis of why there are so 
few strikes”.4 It is these latter factors which, despite Simon’s coyness, need 
addressing. I wish to respond to Simon’s arguments at two levels, neither 
of which seeks to refute or denigrate his analysis, but which seek instead to 
add  observations and different insights. First, it is necessary to rehearse the 
importance of assessing the “balance of class forces”. Second, we need to 
explore critically the strike trends apparent in Britain, which are rooted not 
only in structural factors but also in the dialectic of consciousness.
The balance of class forces 
One of the major tasks of classical Marxist analysis of workers’ propensity 
to take strike action is to unpick the dynamic of workers’ prevailing uneven 
and contradictory consciousness. We need to understand how consciousness 
breaks through from an acceptance of the prevailing bourgeois ideology of 
the capitalist work regime to one in which workers see their interests as 
fundamentally opposed to that of capital. In Gramscian terms, this means 
breaking with the “common sense” view of the world perpetrated by the 
media, education system and so forth into a worldview whereby workers 
exercise “good sense” based on their own collective strength and under-
standing of the antagonism between capital and labour.5 In undertaking this 
task, we should not fall into mechanical traps of  extrapolating from the 
past into the present and future, because as Georg Lukács has argued, con-
sciousness does not develop (or slip away) in linear fashion.6 The shift from 
workers viewing themselves as objects or subalterns, caged and commodi-
fied within the confines of their labour power, into conscious subjects who 
can determine their own future is a dialectical process. As Richard Hyman 
argued in his 1972 book Strikes: 
To do justice to its complexity, industrial sociologists must be attuned to 
this dynamic interaction between structure and consciousness. A static or 
4: Joyce, 2015, p120.
5: Gramsci, 1999, p664.
6: Lukács, 1974, pp108-109. 
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a one-way analysis necessarily distorts social reality, and is therefore an 
inadequate base for understanding industrial behaviour or predicting its 
development.7 
In other words, we cannot assume any stasis but must follow a dyna-
mism in which change can occur without prediction, subject to a build-up 
of forces which break through as stresses and strains accumulate, very much 
as quantum leaps may take place in natural science as sometimes unseen 
pressures accumulate beneath the surface. This process will be a product 
of contradictory pressures shaped by the nature of capitalism, with tipping 
points occurring due to tensions within the system. This is not a deter-
ministic process. While the forces of production take primacy in our 
laboratory of action, the relations of production interplay and interact to 
create the conditions by which action may or may not take place. We may 
predict with certainty the constancy of bourgeois efforts to intensify worker 
exploitation, as this is a product of the inherent contradiction between 
the interests of capital and labour, and the competition between capitalists 
themselves. But as John Molyneux has stated in this journal: 
When it comes to the proletarian side we cannot say, à la Newton, that 
every (bourgeois) action meets with an equal and opposite reaction. It is 
an empirical fact that there has always been resistance to exploitation and 
oppression even in the most difficult circumstances (even in Nazi Germany 
and Stalinist Russia, even in the death camps and the gulag). But it is no 
less a fact that there is always also acquiescence and even collaboration. The 
relative proportions of these different responses vary enormously and not in 
any fixed or mechanical relationship to economic conditions.8
Thus we see periods, or waves, of great labour unrest in history, not 
predictable by tracking the immediate past, but often unforeseen and deter-
mined by leaps in consciousness and breaks with the status quo. It becomes 
possible for such “leaps” in consciousness to follow long periods of labour qui-
escence. Often such waves follow a prolonged period of capital restructuring 
in terms of shifts within the productive forces as capital seeks new areas to 
accumulate as old sectors fade in their capacity continually to generate higher 
than average rates of profit. In the fading sectors, capital is forced to strengthen 
the chains of exploitation through new technology or the  downscaling of 
7: Hyman, 1989, p76.
8: Molyneux, 1995, pp60-61.
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staffing, further exacerbating a crisis of profitability as the organic composition 
of capital (the ratio of capital invested in equipment, machinery, etc compared 
to that invested in labour power) rises ever more steeply. 
In other sectors, such as the auto industry, a problem is created by over-
capacity, as rival manufacturers overstretch themselves in better times in an 
effort to out-strip their rivals. The subsequent adjustments to capacity then 
lead to a brutal process of creative destruction, marked not only by restruc-
turing, mergers and take-overs, but also by intensified exploitation of the 
workforce. Thus we have seen employer efforts to introduce lean production 
methods and robotics which have intensified work and fractured the labour 
force. Overall auto production in the UK has not fallen. The UK remains 
home to over 30 manufacturers building more than 70 models. Similarly the 
volume of autos produced in the UK is set to reach an all time high in 2017.9 
Restructuring has enabled increases in productivity to compensate for labour 
shedding. In addition, the “balance of class forces” at the micro-level of the 
sector has been subject to a focused offensive by employers to smash worker 
autonomy and reduce the potential for collective action. Paul Stewart and his 
co-authors, in their study of the auto industry, quote Peter Titherington, the 
former convener of Vauxhall Ellesmere Port. Talking in 1992 he said: “Under 
the piece rate system we directly sold the fruits of our labour. Under Measured 
Day Work we sold our time. Under lean, management determine our labour 
input and time with a vengeance”.10
Part of the process of the employer offensive was, of course, a strategic 
shift in industrial relations management. The sacking of Derek Robinson, 
convenor at British Leyland’s Longbridge plant, in 1979 heralded a move 
away from management attempts to “bureaucratise” and institutionalise shop 
stewards to a process of union marginalisation.11 Victimisation and sackings of 
union rank and file representatives followed throughout the engineering sector 
in the following two decades, accompanied by downscaling of employment 
as plants were rationalised and new “HRM” (human resource management) 
9: See the auto manufacturers’ annual statistics at www.smmt.co.uk/industry-topics/
uk-automotive-sector/#responsiveTabs1
10: Stewart and others, 2009, p16.
11: A fascinating description of the scale of this “bureaucratisation” is given by ex-Leyland 
worker Dave Lyddon. He wrote in this journal in 1977: “In larger factories there are probably 
now half a dozen senior stewards and convenors who don’t even have a nominal job but who 
are provided by management with an office and telephone, and are paid to be full-time union 
representatives in the factory... Those senior stewards and convenors based in an office cease 
to be the direct representatives of the workers on the spot... Senior stewards don’t share the 
work experience of their members... And they don’t suffer the car workers’ constant insecurity 
of a fluctuating wage packet. Is it any wonder they get out of touch?”—Lyddon, 1977.
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techniques such as insourcing, outsourcing and individual performance related 
pay were introduced. National pay bargaining in the engineering industry 
was abandoned by the employers in 1989 in a drive towards enterprise level 
bargaining and “flexibility”. Research conducted by Andy Danford, Mike 
Richardson and myself at engineering plants in the south west of England 
highlight the devastation: 
The AEEU [Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union, now part of 
Unite] lost every one of its workplace representatives at BAe Systems during 
a redundancy in 1995; 75 percent of its representatives at Rolls Royce were 
made redundant in 1991-92... During the same period many leading MSF 
[Manufacturing, Science and Finance, also now incorporated into Unite] 
Unity Left activists were selected for redundancy...in 1991 the complete 
MSF representatives committee was dismissed at BAe Dynamics...and the 
union was subsequently derecognised.12 
But despite this sobering experience, as both the above quoted 
research studies highlight, there remains union resilience within many of 
these plants. The problem here for the unions is not one of apathy or disin-
terest, but one where union activists have struggled to transcend management 
ideology of “the need for profitability” (the battle here has often been with 
the trade union bureaucracy); of appreciating the necessity of reorienting 
and rethinking union strategy on management offensives such as lean pro-
duction and outsourcing; combined with the need to grow a new cadre of 
younger stewards to implement the strategy. Simon, of course, knows these 
experiences full well through his own research. But in presenting a struc-
turally bound reasoning for the decline in strikes in manufacturing, and by 
placing emphasis on exposure to product market competition and hostile 
legislation as key explanations for decline, he downplays the importance of 
assessing the “balance of class forces” as a qualitative variable.
So what are the prospects for resilience to turn into revival, and how 
does confidence marry into this equation? As I have hopefully begun to 
illustrate, such a process depends as much on a qualitative assessment of 
the balance of class forces as it does on structural factors. We need to assess 
the dialectical relationship between shifts and changes in the forces of pro-
duction and the response found in the social relations of production that 
will provide us with an insight into prospects for the future. Writing in 
this journal in 1979, Tony Cliff emphasised the point. Referring to the 
12: Danford, Richardson, and Upchurch, 2003, p46.
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low level of struggle of traditionally militant workers such as the miners, 
dockers, shipyard workers and engineers he noted new sectors going into 
battle such as tanker drivers, bakers, journalists and firefighters. British 
Oxygen (BOC) workers were also notable for their use of flying pickets 
and Perkins Diesel workers for their use of the occupation tactic. However, 
he refused to be carried away, writing: 
It would be a grave mistake to put the success of the workers of Ford, BOC 
and lorry drivers in the same league as the victory of the miners in 1972 or 
1974. The victory of the miners changed the balance of class forces in the 
country as a whole radically in favour of the working class. The victories of 
Ford, BOC and the lorry drivers did not. For a Marxist a sense of proportion 
is central in grasping reality. The heart of the dialectics—this very important 
if abused concept—is the relations between quantity and quality.13
Of course, as Simon himself identifies, the defeats of the British 
working class in the form of the steel workers, civil servants, printers and 
above all the miners in the 1980s profoundly affected the “balance of 
class forces” in Britain. Part of this shift in balance towards the employers 
involved a degradation of the rank and file activist’s “confidence” and a 
refocusing of the locus of power and authority in the unions towards the 
trade union bureaucracy and their newly adopted mantra of “partnership” 
and “third way” acceptance of neoliberalism. The two trends went hand 
in hand, and created a future in which the battle between rank and file 
and bureaucracy in the unions was focused not just on activists’ ability to 
organise independently of the officials, but also on the necessity of chal-
lenging an ideology that raised the market onto an unassailable pedestal. 
This underlines the importance of “political trade unionism”, based on the 
rank and file, in order to rise to the new challenges.
We can even begin to speculate how “shifts” in aggregate capital 
accumulation play out in a wider arena. Beverly Silver explores these shifts 
within capitalist accumulation strategies and describes a “pendulum” effect 
whereby capitalism as an aggregate whole moves from a crisis of profitability 
(1870s, 1970s), from which state and employers begin renewed offensives 
against labour, to one of a crisis of legitimacy (1930s and today) character-
ised by worker resistance to “the breakdown of established social compacts, 
the re-commodification of labour and growing inter-class inequality”.14 In 
13: Cliff, 1979.
14: Silver, 2014, p59.
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“rising” sectors, such as retail or food distribution, the potential for collec-
tive action by workers assumes an upward trend. As Simon’s tables of strikes 
clearly show,15 it is in these sectors (transport, distribution, etc) that strike 
levels have remained relatively firm, while in mining (essentially destroyed as 
an industry in Britain) and manufacturing (in the process of a long employer 
offensive from widespread restructuring and union marginalisation) strike 
statistics have fallen drastically.16 The potential for strike action in many 
sectors such as food and retail distribution is a relatively novel one but one 
that is certainly real, as witnessed by recent UK strikes at Argos and Hovis, 
as well as strikes in Amazon distribution depots in Germany and against 
Walmart in the United States. 
The point here is that any analysis of strike statistics must take 
account of the longer effects of capital accumulation strategies and the 
consequences for the social relations of production that are redrawn in the 
process. Rather than focus on institutional explanations for the downward 
trend in the UK strike statistics, we should instead force our analysis into 
a wider frame of changes in political economy and the structure of capital 
accumulation. In doing so we should be mindful that since the crisis of 
profitability in the late 1960s onwards we have been witnessing a major 
change in the forces of production, accompanied by a long drawn out 
employer offensive against labour, from which labour has not yet gathered 
its own energies to regroup and fight back on a consistent front. 
We can discern this qualitative change in strikes. Strikes over 
national collective pay agreements (in the past the most common cause of 
strikes) have withered as the selfsame agreements have been thrown on the 
scrapheap by employers. As Kerstin Hamann and colleagues show in their 
data, we see the rise of the (one-day) coordinated public sector strike and 
the general strike, which have come to dominate strike trends in Western 
Europe.17 Theses strikes, often bureaucratically controlled and limited to a 
single day, presage a wider political fight against the austerity engendered 
by the contemporary crisis of capitalism. Indeed, the wave of industrial 
unrest discernible in wider terms across the globe in 2010-11, together with 
the Occupy movement, the Arab Spring and now the explosion of radical 
left parties such as Syriza and Podemos, may, in this context, be preliminary 
skirmishes in a longer period of intensified resistance. 
15: Joyce, 2015, pp130; 131. 
16: Joyce, 2015, tables 2 and 3.
17: Hamann, Johnston, and Kelly, 2013.
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The trade union bureaucracy
The progress of the class struggle is a product not only of the “balance of class 
forces” but also of the mediatory role of institutions or, as Antonio Gramsci 
called them, “earthworks” that surround the citadel of capital, which can act 
as a break on the development of consciousness by the processes of deflec-
tion or containment. Such “earthworks”, at least when Gramsci was writing 
in his Italian prison cell, may include not just the media (nationalist, racist, 
imperialist rhetoric, etc) but also institutions such as the church, which act 
to deflect workers’ class-based dissent into respect for a “higher” mystical 
authority. The trade union bureaucracy and the “social democratic” lead-
erships of “parties of labour” such as the Labour Party in Britain, Pasok in 
Greece, or the SPD in Germany also fulfil a deflective role. However, while 
Simon does refer in his article to the potentially stifling role of the trade union 
bureaucracy, his analysis is only in passing and is consequently subdued. The 
role of the bureaucracy as a factor in limiting and determining rank and file 
confidence needs expansion fully to justify its importance. 
Within a framework of both conservative and social democratic 
governments in power the state as a force of capital may seek accommoda-
tion with the trade union bureaucracy—tied as they are to the “national 
interest”—in order to deradicalise the workers’ movement. Concessions 
are offered to the unions, giving them some “legitimacy” within the body 
politic. This creates space for the normalisation of the dispute as a way of 
workers seeking redress, while at the same time placing responsibility for 
ending the dispute within the hands of trade union leaders. So, in the post 
First World War period, national collective bargaining was encouraged by 
governments and accepted by the majority of employers as a method of 
containing and “institutionalising” industrial conflict in the wake of a rise 
in rank and file unrest. Similarly, the 1968 Donovan Commission brought 
forward a whole range of proposals (“professional” personnel management, 
ACAS mediation and conciliation, formalised and “agreed” discipline and 
grievance procedures, etc) designed to take the sting out of rank and file led 
unofficial action. But most trenchantly the trade union leaderships act as a 
bureaucratic dead hand within the body politic, placing the interest of the 
union “as a whole” before that of militant sections. The social democratic 
ideological orientations of the trade union bureaucracy, encapsulated in 
their organic links with the Labour Party leadership, will also act to ensure 
that the “national” interest (ie of “national” capital) takes precedence over 
class solidarity at key tipping points.18 
18: Joyce, 2015, p136; Darlington and Upchurch, 2012.
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Tipping points occur when the “balance of class forces” sways 
towards the rank and file in periods of labour militancy. In such instances 
a “tipping point” may be engendered by the state to suppress the rank and 
file and even to discipline the trade union leaderships in the process. In turn, 
new legislative powers may be introduced by governments which consoli-
date the locus of power within unions into the hands of the bureaucracy at 
the expense of the rank and file. The TUC’s betrayal of the miners in the 
1926 General Strike is a dramatic example. Walter Citrine, TUC general 
secretary during the strike, was brazen enough to record in his memoirs 
30 years later that he “did not regard the General Strike as a failure”. The 
reason for his view was simply that “the theory of the general strike had 
never been thought out”, and, most trenchantly, that the TUC’s position 
of authority remained intact when it brought a negotiated end to the dis-
pute.19 Citrine sought to “modernise” the trade union movement and acted 
as a collaborator on behalf of the TUC in the 1928 Mond-Turner talks 
with employers which aimed to create a “consensus” system of industrial 
relations. The TUC’s approach failed, as the majority of employers’ organi-
sations sensed the balance of class forces tipping in their favour, and wished 
instead to pursue a relentless offensive against organised labour, including 
work intensification and victimisation of trade union activists. The gov-
ernment pursued a similar strategy, introducing the 1927 Trades Dispute 
and Trade Unions Act, outlawing most general strikes and sympathy action 
and restricting union affiliation to the Labour Party, while at the same time 
bringing to trial and imprisoning many Communist Party militants. 
Nevertheless, it was under this oppressive regime that the engineers’ 
union managed to revive its membership through a process of collectiv-
ising grievances engendered by the selfsame employer offensive. Far from 
operating under benign legislation, as claimed by Simon, the union faced 
increasing hostility on all fronts, including legislation, but managed to increase 
its membership from 190,000 in 1933 to over 900,000 in 1945.20 The 
increase was driven by rank and file action (of apprentices and others) and 
the development of activist networks grouped around papers such as Propellor 
(later renamed New Propellor) which the Communist Party leadership within 
the engineers’ union, together with a critical mass of Communist militants 
in individual workplaces, became duty bound to support. Indeed, the role of 
CP activists was crucial in galvanising and consolidating rank and file con-
fidence. As Richard Croucher records in Engineers at War, “They...were 
19: Citrine, 1964, pp216-217.
20: Croucher and Upchurch, 2012.
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prepared to go where wiser men had feared to tread”.21  
A second key period can be located just prior to the great upturn in 
industrial struggle in the 1970s. Indeed, we can argue that a sea-change in the 
body politic began to gestate in the late 1960s and bloomed in the 1970s as the 
post-war economic boom collapsed. It was a Labour government that dealt the 
first blow to the unions. This is encapsulated in Labour prime minister Harold 
Wilson’s tirade against the National Union of Seamen in 1966, whereby, as 
his cabinet colleague Lord Wigg recalls, “Wilson’s conduct reached a high 
water mark... Single handed he smashed a strike”.22 Wilson’s project was one 
in which Labour sought not just to smash the rank and file but also to humil-
iate the leadership of a recalcitrant union as well. The old “consensus” welfare 
politics of national collective bargaining and relatively liberal trade union leg-
islation gave way to a markedly more aggressive capitalism (including a search 
for new global markets and labour power) against the background of a decline 
in corporate profitability across the advanced industrial nations. 
The ensuing three decades have been dominated by the longue durée 
of coordinated employer attacks on working conditions, social benefits and 
pay, including Thatcher’s 1980s assault on the bastions of union power. 
It is this denial of a “safe space” for the unions that has severely affected 
trade union leaders’ ability to gain concessions from both employer and 
state, leading to a crisis of a particularised form of “social democratic trade 
unionism” and Labourism.23 This crisis has not only denied legitimacy for 
trade union action (for example through legislative changes) but has also 
disoriented union activists from their familiar channels of parliamentary 
representation after the Labour Party’s retreat into social liberalism. This 
political shift has been linked to the raft of structural changes in contract 
expectations trading under the guise of “flexibility”, which include not only 
the employer-driven collapse of national collective bargaining in the manu-
facturing sector but also the privatisation of public sector services. Again a 
Labour government has been able to deliver this with some gusto. Note, 
for example, Tony Blair’s arrogant introduction to the 1998 “Fairness at 
Work” White Paper, that “Britain will have the most lightly regulated 
labour market of any leading economy in the world”.24 This has formed 
the backdrop to the period covered in Simon’s article, and the implications 
must be understood in totality if we are to explain the low level of strikes.
21: Croucher, 1982, p33.
22: Quoted in Rosewell, 1973.
23: Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers, 2009.
24: Blair, 1998.
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Cliff sensed the sea-change as long ago as 1971 when he wrote on 
the tasks at the time facing revolutionaries in workplaces when the working 
class was fragmented and driven into sectional interest. He records: “The 
old forest of reformism is withering. The trees are without leaves, the 
trunks are dying. But, in society, old ideas are not wiped out unless they are 
replaced by new ones”.25 The task of replacing the old with the new did, 
of course, bear fruit in the early 1970s. Cliff even seemed taken by surprise 
by the turn of events. Writing two years later in 1973 he was intrigued by 
the rapid upturn in strike days “lost”. He went out of his way to attack the 
treacherous role of the trade union leaders. Their role was to hinder rather 
than help. On the 1972 miners’ strike he wrote: 
The trade union bureaucracy has been treacherous... [Miners’ leader] Joe 
Gormley declared on the eve of the strike that if the government had raised 
the offer just a little the strike would not have taken place—he would 
probably have signed for £3... It was the initiative of the miners’ rank and 
file, in picketing power stations instead of wasting effort on picketing the 
pits, that led the way. Helped by railwaymen, lorry drivers and workers in 
the power industry, they won a magnificent victory. 
On the dockers’ campaign to release the Pentonville Five, jailed 
under Tory anti-union law, Cliff wrote: 
Again, look at the dockers’ struggle. It was a magnificent victory over the 
government when the five dockers were freed. The strike was unofficial. 
[Transport workers’ leader] Jack Jones kept his mouth shut, and did nothing at 
all to help the dockers. Reg Prentice, the shadow minister of labour, attacked 
the five dockers for breaking the law, and seeking self-advertisement.26
In the following years the high point of 1972 receded into the 
downturn, as the trade union leaderships, including those affiliated to the 
Communist Party such as Ken Gill of the manufacturing staff union TASS, 
once again bailed out the system by agreeing the “social contract” with a 
Labour government. The point, however, had been made, in that both the 
Labour Party and the trade union bureaucracy operated at high points in the 
struggle with interests opposite to that of the rank and file. They would act 
to suppress militancy and hence severely damage the ability and confidence 
25: Cliff, 1971.
26: Cliff, 1973.
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of the rank and file to strike and win. 
The emphasis on the rank and file has, of course, been central to the 
International Socialist tradition. This is not, however, because of some syn-
dicalist obsession with militancy. Rather it is in recognition of the fact that 
the power of the employers and the state can only be overcome by mass 
action in the workplace. Such mass activism is driven by rank and file con-
fidence, which in turn is subject to the ability to act independently of the 
trade union leaderships and the Labour Party. This requires political direc-
tion and leadership, both to explain and expose the role of the trade union 
leaders and to generalise the struggle in times of uneven consciousness. This 
is not to say that the trade union leaders are omnipotent, but rather that the 
relationship between the power of capital, the trade union leaderships and 
the rank and file is a fluid one. As Cliff succinctly wrote in 1988: 
The trade union bureaucracy is always vacillating between the two main 
forces, workers and the employers. If they completely supported the 
employers they would lose their base. They sometimes support the 
workers against the employers for fear of losing everything. The degree of 
independence of the rank and file from the bureaucracy is in proportion 
to the level of confidence of the rank and file towards the employers. If 
the workers are very confident they can turn to the bureaucracy and say 
although you exist we don’t care too much about you.27
The lesson for today is that we cannot summon the necessary confi-
dence out of the air. It has to be rebuilt through networks of rank and file 
militants working in varying degree sometimes with trade union officials 
and sometimes against them. Our task as revolutionary socialists remains the 
same, albeit with increased difficulty. Indeed, it is perhaps these increased 
difficulties that Simon has located within his article. Not only have massive 
structural changes in the economy militated against labour struggle, but 
economic factors (low inflation and high unemployment) have blunted 
the edge of the propensity to strike. I have attempted in this reply to add 
further thoughts located in a longer view of changes in political economy, 
the decline of the social democratic body politic and so on, that have acted 
to reshape the framework in which we may expect to see a revival of rank 
and file confidence. I suggest that both employers and the state have taken 
advantage of the new context and acted over a long period to consolidate 
the balance of class forces in their favour. But there is a contradiction here, 
27: Cliff, 1988.
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as it is precisely this capitalist offensive that has acted to delegitimise the 
root of their authority and added grist to the generalised crisis (political, 
economic and social) of the system. It is from this particularised contra-
diction that the roots of opposition and dissent continue to flourish. The 
dialectic of the transformation of anger and dissent into industrial struggle, 
however, remains unpredictable. 
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